feat(web): opt-in X-Forwarded-For keying for the rate limiter behind a trusted proxy#156
Conversation
…a trusted proxy The in-memory limiter keyed on the client socket IP. Behind a reverse proxy — the documented deployment for network exposure — every request carries the proxy's IP, collapsing all clients into one shared bucket: one noisy client exhausts the limit for everyone. New opt-in setting MEDCHECK_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS uses the first X-Forwarded-For hop as the bucket key. Off by default because the header is client-spoofable without a trusted proxy in front (and would then allow limiter bypass). SECURITY.md documents that the proxy's own limiter should remain the primary control in proxied deployments. Fixes #142 Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01W4svt5QTs4WUMSy4HwiVt9
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Summary
The in-memory rate limiter (#110) keyed on the client socket IP. Behind a reverse proxy — the deployment SECURITY.md/README recommend for network exposure — every request carries the proxy's IP, collapsing all clients into one shared bucket: a single noisy client exhausts the limit for everyone.
Fixes #142
Changes
src/medcheck/core/config.py: newSettings.trust_proxy_headers(MEDCHECK_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS, off by default)src/medcheck/web/app.py:_client_key()— uses the firstX-Forwarded-Forhop as the rate-limit key only when the flag is set; falls back to the socket IP when the header is absent. Off by default because the header is client-spoofable without a trusted proxy (and would then allow trivial limiter bypass — covered by a test)SECURITY.md: documents the flag and that the proxy's own rate limiting should remain the primary control in proxied deployments (the in-process limiter is per-worker)README.md+.env.example: documentMEDCHECK_TRUST_PROXY_HEADERStests/unit/test_web.py: 3 new tests — spoofed header ignored by default (no bypass), distinct forwarded clients get distinct buckets when trusted, missing header falls back to socket IPTesting
uv run pytest) — 200 passeduv run pytest --cov-fail-under=85) — 90.25%uv run ruff check .)uv run mypy src/medcheck --strict)🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01W4svt5QTs4WUMSy4HwiVt9
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